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developmental and Educational Psychology, leiden university, leiden, the netherlands
ABSTRACT
This study examined differences in transfer of analogical reasoning 
after analogy-problem solving between 40 gifted and 95 average-
ability children (aged 9–10  years old), utilising dynamic testing 
principles. This approach was used in order to examine potential 
differences between gifted and average-ability children in relation 
to progression after training, and with regard to the question 
whether training children in analogy problem-solving elicits transfer 
of analogical reasoning skills to an analogy construction-task. 
Children were allocated to one of two experimental conditions: either 
children received unguided practice in analogy problem-solving, or 
they were provided with this in addition to training incorporating 
graduated prompting techniques. The results showed that gifted and 
average-ability children who were trained made more progress in 
analogy problem-solving than their peers who received unguided 
practice experiences only. Gifted and average-ability children were 
found to show similar progression in analogy problem-solving, and 
gifted children did not appear to have an advantage in the analogy-
construction transfer task. The dynamic training seemed to bring 
about no additional improvement on the transfer task over that of 
unguided practice experiences only.
Introduction
Applying knowledge to a new context is an important necessity in order for gained knowl-
edge and skills to be of use in everyday life outside the classroom context (Day & Goldstone, 
2012), and is therefore one of the main aims of education. Groups of children have been 
found to differ in the extent to which they transfer learned knowledge and skills. Some 
groups of learners have been found to have an advantage in transfer of learning, one such 
group being the gifted. Gifted children have long been thought to have an excellent ability 
to transfer learning to a new situation (e.g. Renzulli et al., 1997).
Various studies have shown that eliciting transfer of learning to new contexts proves 
difficult (Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 2001; Day & Goldstone, 2012; Gick & Holyoak, 1983), 
possibly due to its complex (Nokes-Malach & Mestre, 2013), and idiosyncratic nature 
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(Kyllonen, Lohman, & Snow, 1984). Transfer has been noted for its potential to reveal impor-
tant insights into children’s potential for learning (Bosma & Resing, 2006; Ferrara, Brown, & 
Campione, 1986). Therefore, in dynamic testing, transfer of newly acquired knowledge and 
skills is one of the measures used to gain insight into a child’s potential for learning (Sternberg 
& Grigorenko, 2002; Tzuriel, 2007). In contrast with conventional static testing, dynamic test-
ing is a form of testing that incorporates feedback and instruction, sometimes tailored to 
the individual, into the testing process (Elliott, 2003; Jeltova et al., 2007), and is focused on 
the potential for learning, rather than on previously acquired skills and knowledge (Resing 
& Elliott, 2011).
In the present study, we applied dynamic testing principles to examine whether cogni-
tively gifted and average-ability 9 and 10 year old children would show differential changes 
in analogy problem-solving, and patterns in their ability to transfer analogy problem-solving 
skills to an analogy-construction task. All the children in the present study received oppor-
tunities for unguided practice in analogy problem-solving. Half of the children, however, 
received an additional training in analogy problem-solving, which enabled us to investigate 
whether training would lead to more changes over time in problem-solving than unguided 
practice, and facilitate transfer of the learned skills.
Dynamic testing outcomes are assumed to provide a more detailed picture of a child’s 
cognitive potential (Elliott, Grigorenko, & Resing, 2010), and strengths and weaknesses 
(Jeltova et al., 2007), than conventional, static testing procedures, such as intelligence or 
school aptitude tests (Elliott, 2003). This form of testing has been found to be especially 
beneficial for special populations, such as ethnic minority, or learning disabled children 
(Robinson-Zañartu & Carlson, 2013; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002). Perhaps due to these 
reasons, the large majority of research into dynamic testing has focused on special groups 
of children. Studies into dynamic testing of gifted children, however, are few. Findings of 
such studies have revealed that gifted children not only outperformed their non-gifted 
peers, but also showed significantly more improvement (Calero, García-Martín, & Robles, 
2011). Moreover, young gifted children were found to have a wider zone of proximal devel-
opment, to learn new skills faster, and to be better at generalising new knowledge (Kanevsky, 
1990, 2000).
Dynamic tests often employ inductive reasoning tasks (e.g. Ferrara et al., 1986; Resing & 
Elliott, 2011). Inductive reasoning is assumed to be related to a large variety of higher-order 
cognitive skills and processes, including general intelligence (Klauer & Phye, 2008), prob-
lem-solving (Richland & Burchinal, 2012), and applying knowledge and skills (Goswami, 
2012). Analogical reasoning, a subtype of inductive reasoning, is considered to play a central 
role in cognitive development (Klauer & Phye, 2008; Pellegrino & Glaser, 1982), and develops 
significantly throughout childhood (e.g. Leech, Mareschal, & Cooper, 2008). Children with 
strong cognitive capacities, such as gifted and talented children, are often found to achieve 
higher scores on analogical reasoning tasks (e.g. Caropreso & White, 1994).
Several studies in the field of dynamic testing have revealed that training incorporating 
graduated prompting techniques can lead to improvement in reasoning by analogy (Bosma 
& Resing, 2006; Ferrara et al., 1986; Stevenson, Heiser, & Resing, 2013). Graduated prompting 
techniques, as used in the present study, refer to a form of an intervention in which children 
are provided with prompts each time they make a mistake in problem solving. In the current 
study, prompts are tailored to each individual problem to be solved, and become more 
specific gradually, from metacognitive to cognitive prompts and modelling (Resing & Elliott, 
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2011). These techniques are used increasingly in combination with a pretest-training-posttest 
format, as in the present study, a specific form of dynamic testing that allows for structured 
measuring of children’s progression in learning (e.g. Ferrara et al., 1986; Resing, Bakker, Pronk, 
& Elliott, 2016; Resing & Elliott, 2011).
Analogical reasoning involves defining and deciding that two problem-solving situations 
are similar, and, ultimately, successfully transferring previously problem-solving experiences 
to new situations that can be, partially, dissimilar. Unsurprisingly, reasoning by analogy is 
considered to be closely related to the ability to transfer (Gentner, Holyoak, & Kokinov, 2001); 
both require that one observes an analogy or similarity between two problems (Chi & 
VanLehn, 2012; Holyoak, 1984). In general, two factors have been proposed to play a role in 
transfer: the content, the exact problem that is being transferred (Barnett & Ceci, 2002), and 
the context (Klahr & Chen, 2011), which refers to the different domains from and to which 
the problem is being transferred. Researchers often distinguish in different types of transfer 
on the basis of the surface similarity of the base and target problem, including near versus 
far transfer (Mestre, 2005), and surface versus deep transfer (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995). 
If the base and target share few surface similarities, and are thus less similar, the more cog-
nitively demanding the process of transfer becomes (Gentner, Loewenstein, & Hung, 2007). 
Transferring effectively involves mastery of the task to be transferred (Siegler, 2006), and a 
deep rather than surface understanding of the task at hand is required for deep transfer 
(Barnett & Ceci, 2002).
It is often assumed that gifted children transfer knowledge more efficiently than their 
non-gifted peers (e.g. Klavir & Gorodetsky, 2001; Zook & Maier, 1994). Research into the 
transfer ability of this group of children has revealed that, on near transfer tasks, gifted 
children’s performance seems similar to their non-gifted peers (Carr, Alexander, & 
Schwanenflugel, 1996). In far transfer tasks, however, gifted children were found to outper-
form their non-gifted peers (Geake, 2008; Kanevsky, 2000). Kanevsky (1990) reported that, 
after learning new strategies, gifted learners spontaneously transferred these strategies to 
new learning contexts. The underlying processes facilitating transfer in the gifted population 
are not yet fully understood, but Carr and colleagues (1996) suggest that gifted learners are 
more likely to transfer their acquired strategies to other domains, as they show an elaborate 
understanding, and make more use of complex strategies.
As eliciting transfer is challenging (e.g. Barnett & Ceci, 2002), a variety of studies have 
been carried out investigating whether training facilitating deep understanding or mastery 
of a task could promote transfer. Several studies have revealed that training children in 
solving inductive reasoning problems led to higher levels of generalising skills learned during 
training to similar and dissimilar problems (e.g. Harpaz-Itay, Kaniel, & Ben-Amram, 2006; 
Roth-van der Werf, Resing, & Slenders, 2002; Tzuriel, 2007). In the present study, we utilised 
a ‘reversal’ procedure to measure transfer. Having had practice opportunities, or practice 
opportunities in combination with a short training in analogy problem-solving, participants 
were asked to construct their own analogy items, similar to the ones they had solved before, 
which then had to be solved by the examiner (Bosma & Resing, 2006; Kohnstamm, 2014; 
Stevenson et al., 2013). As such, this task required a reversal of roles.
In order to promote transfer of problem-solving strategies practiced or trained, we kept 
the surface features of our analogy construction task similar to those of the open-ended 
visuo-spatial geometrical analogy items children solved before (Resing et al., 2016), assuming 
that children would use previously acquired knowledge and skills in their constructed 
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analogies (Day & Goldstone, 2012). Previous research, however, has shown that despite these 
similarities in surface structure, the analogy construction task is a challenging and difficult 
task for children (Bosma & Resing, 2006; Tzuriel & George, 2009).
The present study had two main aims. Although consideration of the occurrence of trans-
fer was our primary research aim, we were also interested in whether children’s analogy 
problem-solving would improve differentially. Firstly, we sought to examine children’s poten-
tial for learning. We expected that training by dynamic testing would lead to more change 
in children’s analogy problem-solving than unguided practice only. We anticipated larger 
progression in accuracy scores of the children who were dynamically trained than the chil-
dren who received unguided practice only (Stevenson et al., 2013; Tunteler, Pronk, & Resing, 
2008). We further anticipated that progression in accuracy would be larger for gifted than 
average-ability children, and there would be a significant interaction between session, con-
dition and ability group for the accuracy scores (Calero et al., 2011).
We also considered the time it took children to complete all of the items of a test session. 
We expected that results for children in the unguided practice would show a decrease in 
completion time, but not for those in the dynamic testing condition, as we expected that 
training would lead children to spend time on strategic considerations (Resing, Tunteler, & 
Elliott, 2015). We also expected a significant three-way interaction of 
Session × Condition × Ability group as to children’s completion time, and hypothesised that 
gifted children would be more time efficient than their average-ability peers, considering 
they are assumed to be better in self-regulation (Calero, García-Martín, Jiménez, Kazén, & 
Araque, 2007).
Our second research question concerned the transfer of learned skills. As proposed by 
Clerc, Miller, and Cosnefroy (2014), in-depth assessment of transfer requires the measuring 
of both performance, as well as the degree of transfer achieved. Therefore, in the current 
study, we focused on both the transfer accuracy scores, as well as on the difficulty level of 
the analogies constructed by the children. We expected that, in comparison with children 
in the unguided practice condition, trained children would show higher levels of transfer 
accuracy scores; as well as difficulty levels of accurately constructed analogies (Roth-van der 
Werf et al., 2002). In addition, we expected that gifted children would show a higher degree 
of transfer than their average-ability peers (Geake, 2008; Kanevsky, 1990). We further explored 
whether children’s transfer performance and degree of transfer could be predicted by their 
analogy problem-solving accuracy scores (Alexander & Murphy, 1999).
Method
Participants
In the present study, 135 children participated, 62 boys and 73 girls, ranging in age from 
9 years and 3 months to 10 years and 11 months (M = 10.10; SD = .60). All the participants 
were born in the Netherlands, and attended either a mainstream primary school, or a special 
setting for gifted and talented children in the western part in the Netherlands. All schools 
participated on a voluntary basis. Gifted children were over-sampled and identified on the 
basis of a qualitative judgment of parents and teachers regarding their giftedness. 
Additionally, all of the children in our gifted sample each scored at, or above the 90th per-
centile on the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices Test (Raven, 1981). Written permission 
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of parents and school was obtained for each child prior to participation in the current study. 
Nine children dropped out in the course of the study, as they did not participate in each test 
session.
Design
The study used a two-session (pre-test, post-test) repeated measures randomised blocking 
design with two treatment conditions: dynamic testing versus unguided practice (see Table 
1). All children were provided with opportunities to practice analogy problem-solving at 
pre-test and post-test, with both test sessions taking approximately 20 min to administer. 
In addition, only the children in the dynamic testing condition received two short training 
sessions, of approximately 20 min each, between pre-test and post-test. The children in the 
unguided practice condition did not receive training, but were provided with a two-session 
control task, in which they were asked to solve figural maths problems. The time taken for 
this task was similar to that for the dynamic training to keep the time-on-task for all children 
as equal as possible. Before the pre-test, the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices Test (Raven, 
1981) was administered to allocate children to the two treatment conditions. Children who 
had obtained a Raven percentile score of at least 90 were included in the ‘gifted’ condition. 
All other children were included in the ‘average-ability’ condition. Raven scores were further 
used to ensure that any differences in initial reasoning ability were as small as possible across 
the children in the dynamic testing and unguided practice conditions. Within the two ability 
groups, pairs of children with equal scores (blocking) were randomly assigned to the dynamic 
testing or unguided practice condition, resulting in four subgroups of children: gifted 
dynamic testing (n = 22), gifted unguided practice (n = 18), average-ability dynamic testing 
(n = 47) and average-ability unguided practice (n = 48).
Materials
Raven standard progressive matrices test
The Raven Standard Progressive Matrices Test (Raven, 1981), a non-verbal intelligence test 
measuring fluid intelligence, was used as a blocking instrument. The Raven test results were 
shown to have a high level of internal consistency in several studies as shown by split-half-co-
efficients of r = .91 (Raven, 1981). In the current study, the 1992 corrected norm scores for 
the Dutch population were used to calculate percentile scores for the participating 
children.
Table 1. overview of the design.
Condition Groups Dynamic/static test
Raven Pre-test Training 1 Training 2 Post-test Transfer 
dynamic testing gifted (n = 22) X X dynamic 
training 1
dynamic 
training 2
X X
average-ability 
(n = 47)
X X dynamic 
training 1
dynamic 
training 2
X X
unguided 
practice
gifted (n = 18) X X control task control task X X
average-ability 
(n = 48) 
X X control task control task X X
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Dynamic test of analogical reasoning
Pre-test and post-test. The dynamic test utilised visuo-spatial geometric analogies of the 
type A:B::C:?? of varying difficulty, part of a test battery developed by Hosenfeld, Van den 
Boom, and Resing (1997), and adapted for further use by Tunteler and colleagues (2008). 
Six basic geometrical shapes were used in the construction of the analogies: squares, 
triangles, hexagons, pentagons, circles, and ellipses (see Figure 1 for an example of a 
difficult analogy item, the instructions provided to the children during the pre-test, as well 
as the correct answer). The original analogy test items were constructed by a maximum 
of five possible transformations: changing position, adding or subtracting an element, 
changing size, halving, and doubling. As the original item-sets have been used for young 
children of various ages, but not for children from the age of nine, the items used in 
the current study were adapted by adding extra transformations, including rotation and 
colour. The test was administered as an open-ended paper-and-pencil test, and children 
drew their answers.
Both the pre-test and the post-test consisted of 21 items of varying difficulty. For pre- and 
post-test, parallel versions were constructed by keeping the difficulty levels of the items the 
same, as well as the order in which the items of varying difficulty were presented. Participants 
received minimal instructions during the pre- and post-test, specifying they had to solve 
puzzles by filling the empty square with the appropriate shapes. They did not receive feed-
back on their answers. In our sample of participants, the pre-test was found to have high 
internal consistency (α = .85) for the accuracy scores.
Dynamic training. Two short training sessions each consisting of six new analogy items 
were administered between the pre-test and post-test to participants in the dynamic testing 
condition. The training sessions employed graduated prompting techniques used in earlier 
studies (e.g. Resing & Elliott, 2011). These involve the provision of a number of prompts when 
the child makes an error in problem-solving. All prompts were administered hierarchically: 
starting with four very general metacognitive prompts, followed by four specific cognitive 
prompts, tailor-made for each item. As each new prompt became progressively more specific, 
this procedure enabled measurement of the child’s need for differing degrees of help in 
order to solve the problem presented. Both training sessions consisted of eight prompts in 
total, which were only administered after indication that a child could not solve the problem 
independently.
After each prompt, children were asked to draw the solution of the analogy, and check 
whether their solution was correct. If a child had not solved the analogy after the seventh 
prompt had been administered, the examiner modelled the correct answer. After the chil-
dren’s final answer, they were asked to explain why they thought their answer was correct. 
Figure 1. Example of a difficult analogy item, the correct answer and the instructions provided.
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Finally, the tester provided a correct self-explanation. Figure 2 shows a flowchart of the 
training procedure. Figure 3 includes a sample item showing answers children provided at 
each step of the graduated prompts procedure.
Transfer: analogy construction task
Transfer was measured by means of an analogy construction task. As part of this task, children 
were asked to construct their own analogy, so the examiner could solve it. In a sense, the 
roles were reversed, and the child became the teacher (Bosma & Resing, 2006). Participants 
were provided with four squares, similar to those used in the previous test sessions, but then 
empty, and instructed that they could utilise any of the geometric shapes they had seen in 
prior sessions, and to provide instructions to the examiner on how to solve the analogy. 
Children were asked to complete two reversal trials, and thus construct two analogies. For 
both tasks, the children were given short, general instructions only to enhance spontaneous 
problem-solving behaviour. After construction of the analogy item, the child had to ask the 
examiner to solve the item, and, on completion of the analogy by the examiner, then had 
to explain why this was the correct answer.
General procedure
Children were tested once weekly, in accordance with the schools’ availability, over a period 
of six consecutive weeks. All parts of the present study were administered individually, fol-
lowing standard, protocolled instruction. At the beginning of the pre-test, training and post-
test sessions, the children were provided with the six geometrical shapes used in the 
analogies, and, in cooperation with the examiner, named each shape, after which the exam-
iner asked the child to draw the shapes below the printed shapes, staying as close to the 
original as possible (Tunteler et al., 2008). It was assumed that this procedure helped activate 
children’s prior knowledge, ensured that the examiner and child used the same terminology 
when addressing the geometric shapes, and facilitated the scoring procedure. The test ses-
sions were administered by master’s students of psychology, who, prior to testing, received 
Figure 2. Flowchart of the graduated prompts training protocol.
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extensive training in working with the test protocols. For each child, all the test sessions 
were administered by the same examiner.
Scoring and analyses
The outcome variables of the pre-test and post-test sessions consisted of the accuracy score, 
the total number of correct items per session, and the completion time, the time (in seconds) 
it took each child to solve all the items of the pre-test and post-test.
We examined two outcome variables of the analogy construction task: transfer accuracy, 
and difficulty level. Outcome variables were (1) the sum of accurately constructed analogies 
(range 0–2), and (2) the transfer difficulty. In former research, it has been suggested that the 
number of different elements an item contains, as well as the number of transformations 
necessary to solve the analogy correctly are indicative of the difficulty level of an analogy 
item (Hosenfeld et al., 1997; Mulholland, Pellegrino, & Glaser, 1980; Tunteler et al., 2008).
In concordance with former studies, in the present study the difficulty level of a con-
structed analogy was calculated by means of the equation correctness of the analogy con-
structed (1/0) × the number of transformations used in the construction of the analogy (1–8) 
(Mulholland et al., 1980; Stevenson et al., 2013). As the children were asked to construct two 
analogy items, their accuracy score ranged from ‘0’, no correct analogy item, to ‘1’, one correct 
analogy item, to ‘2’, two correct analogy items. A constructed analogy was considered correct 
if, in addition to being solvable, the item contained at least two of the shapes used in the 
items part of the preceding test sessions, and at least one transformation from A to B that 
Figure 3. sample item of an analogy item used in training 1, including a child’s solutions provided after 
every prompt.
EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 905
could also be applied from C to D. All children’s responses were scored by the examiner, and 
checked by the first author. Prior to data analysis, the examiners were provided with extensive 
training in data collection, and scoring.
The total difficulty level score obtained by each child (range 0–14) was calculated by 
adding the difficulty level scores of both items. Both outcome variables were considered to 
be ordinal, violating the assumptions of least-squares regression. Therefore, we conducted 
ordinal logistic regression analysis (Agresti, 2010). The regression analyses included the fol-
lowing predicting variables: condition, ability group, condition × ability group, post-test 
accuracy score, and condition × post-test accuracy score.
Results
Initial group comparisons
Prior to analysing our research questions, we evaluated possible differences between the 
two experimental conditions, and ability groups, respectively. The children in the two con-
ditions did not differ in their age (p = .48, ηp
2 < .001) or initial reasoning performance (Raven 
accuracy score; p = .97, ηp
2 < .001). Children in the gifted and non-gifted groups also did not 
differ in age (p = .85, ηp
2 < .001), but did in their initial reasoning performance (p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .48). We further evaluated possible differences in pre-test performance, and found no 
significant differences in accuracy scores, or in completion time between children in the two 
experimental conditions. Gifted and non-gifted children were found to differ on their accu-
racy scores (p < .001, ηp
2 = .16), but not on their completion time (p = .29, ηp
2 = .01). Basic 
statistics for the measures used in the current study are provided in Table 2.
Analogy problem-solving
Our first research question concerned changes in analogy problem-solving. Changes over 
time were examined by means of two repeated measures ANOVAs with one within-subjects 
factor Session (Pre-test – Post-test), and two between-subjects factors Condition (dynamic 
Table 2. Basic statistics of the analogical measurements, divided by condition and ability group.
Dynamic testing Unguided practice
Gifted
Aver-
age-ability Total Gifted
Aver-
age-ability Total
N 22 47 69 18 48 66
Raven accuracy 
scores
M 49.73 38.94 42.38 49.89 38.69 41.74
sd 2.51 5.90 7.15 2.78 6.18 7.41
Pre-test accuracy 
scores
M 10.77 5.91 7.46 9.83 7.08 7.83
sd 4.38 4.14 4.77 4.29 3.71 4.04
completion 
time
M 1267.45 1207.52 1266.63 1331.09 1199.09 1235.09
sd 302.80 564.37 494.54 367.80 471.58 446.87
Post-test accuracy 
scores
M 15.41 11.83 12.97 11.06 8.27 9.03
sd 3.42 4.89 4.76 5.13 4.15 4.57
solving-time M 1055.05 1104.34 1088.62 1075.78 1027.42 1040.61
sd 226.26 329.50 299.65 270.99 325.55 310.34
transfer accuracy 
scores
M 1.77 1.66 1.62 1.94 1.50 1.70
sd .43 .60 .65 .24 .72 .55
complexity M 8.00 7.40 7.59 6.89 5.46 5.85
sd 3.10 3.31 3.23 2.70 3.36 3.24
906 B. VOGELAAR AND W. C. M. RESING
testing versus unguided practice) and Ability group (gifted versus average-ability). Children’s 
accuracy scores and completion time at Pre-test and Post-test were used as the dependent 
variables. In Table 3, the main and interaction effects of the repeated measures ANOVAs are 
provided. Results for accuracy scores revealed significant main effects of Session (p < .01, 
ηp
2 = .39), and, most important for answering our hypothesis, a significant Session × Condition 
(p < .01, ηp
2 = .20) interaction, but no significant Session × Ability group (p = .39), or 
Session × Condition × Ability group interaction (p = .36). Inspection of Table 3 led to the 
conclusion that, only partially in accordance with our hypotheses, dynamically trained chil-
dren, irrespective of their ability group, showed significantly greater progression in solving 
analogies than control-group children. The slopes of the progression lines of the two dynam-
ically tested groups of children did not significantly differ, indicating that children in both 
ability groups made comparable progress in accuracy although they started at different 
levels. The between-subjects effects of Ability group for accuracy supported this finding, 
F(1,131) = 23.42, p < .001, ηp
2 = .15.
A second aspect of children’s analogy solving concerned the time they needed to com-
plete all tasks of a test session. Although we expected that completion time would decrease 
for the children in the unguided practice condition, but not for the trained children, the 
repeated measures ANOVA showed only a significant main effect of session (p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .14), but no significant interaction effects (see Table 3). Contrary to our expectations, 
all groups of children showed a comparable decrease in their completion-time from pre-test 
to post-test.
These results led us to conclude that training leads to more improvement in accuracy 
than practice opportunities, as assumed, but, unexpectedly, that training and unguided 
practice both led to a decrease in solving time. Gifted and average-ability children seemed 
to differ in terms of the number of items solved correctly, as expected, with an advantage 
for those who were gifted, but, in contrast to our hypotheses, not in terms of change from 
pre-test to post-test, and training benefits in relation to both accuracy scores and completion 
time. Of course, individual differences in scores and changes in scores were large for children 
in both ability groups and conditions.
Transfer of analogy problem-solving
Our second research question concerned children’s performance on the analogy construction 
transfer task. Ten children were unable to construct any accurate analogies, with eight 
Table 3. Results of the repeated measures anoVas for the accuracy scores, and completion time.
***p < .001.
Wilks’ λ F ηp
2
accuracy scores
 session .62 82.09*** .39
 session × condition .80 32.39*** .20
 session × ability group .99 .76 .01
 session × condition × ability group .99 .84 .01
completion time
 session .86 21.75*** .14
 session × condition 1.00 .49 <.01
 session × ability group .99 1.47 .01
 session × condition × ability group 1.00 .03 <.01
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children constructing items that were partial analogies, and two constructing items that 
were non-analogical. Out of 135 children, 27 and 98 children, accurately constructed either 
one, or two analogies, respectively (see Table 4). As a further exploration of the data, the 
children who had been able to construct accurate analogies were divided in three groups, 
based on the difficulty level of the analogies they constructed: low, medium, and high. 
Considering that it was the first time we used construction of geometric analogy items as a 
transfer task, as an explorative analysis, we investigated possible individual differences in 
transfer and the effect of training by equally dividing the children post hoc into three groups, 
based on the number of transformations their self-constructed analogies contained. Chi 
square tests revealed that children in the unguided practice condition constructed more 
analogies of a low difficulty level than the trained children (χ2(1, N = 37) = 4.57, p = .03), that 
trained children designed more difficult items than non-trained children (χ2(1, N = 41) = 5.49, 
p = .02), while the children who had constructed analogies of medium difficulty level were 
distributed evenly (χ2(1, N = 47) = .53, p = .47). These findings revealed a first indication of 
the effect of training on transfer accuracy and difficulty level.
In addition, two Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted, one for each condition, to explore 
whether gifted and average-ability children were distributed evenly in relation to the diffi-
culty level of the analogies they constructed. The results revealed that gifted and aver-
age-ability children were distributed evenly across the three difficulty level groups in the 
dynamic testing (U = 448, z = −.53, p = .60), and the unguided practice condition (U = 392, 
z = .24, p = .81).
An ordinal regression analysis was conducted to examine whether the number of accu-
rately constructed analogies could be predicted by condition (dynamic testing versus 
unguided practice), ability group (gifted versus average-ability), and post-test accuracy. The 
results (see Table 5) revealed that the post-test accuracy score (p < .001) could significantly 
predict transfer performance. Although neither condition (p = .18), nor ability group (p = .50) 
significantly contributed to prediction, the condition × ability group interaction did (p = .04). 
The interaction showed, contrary to our hypotheses, a negative effect, indicating lower scores 
for gifted children who were trained.
Table 4. children’s transfer accuracy and difficulty level, divided by condition and ability group.
Dynamic testing Unguided practice
Gifted Average-ability Total Gifted Average-ability Total
inaccurate 
analogies
 non-analogical 0 0 0 0 2 2
 Partial 
analogical
0 3 3 0 5 5
accurate analogies
 low difficulty 
(2–6 
transformations)
4 7 11 8 18 26
 Medium 
difficulty (7–9 
transformations)
10 16 26 5 16 21
 high difficulty 
(10–16 
transformations)
8 20 28 5 8 13
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A second ordinal regression analysis was conducted to examine whether transfer difficulty 
level could be predicted by condition, ability group and post-test accuracy. The findings 
indicated that only the post-test accuracy scores contributed significantly to prediction 
(p < .001). In sum, children’s post-test accuracy score seemed to be a good predictor of 
transfer accuracy and difficulty level, regardless of training or ability group. Unexpectedly, 
however, the gifted children who received unguided practice seemed to outperform the 
gifted children who were trained in terms of transfer accuracy. An exploration of the quality 
of the constructed analogies suggested that differences between children were found mainly 
in the items of lower and higher difficulty group, with training seemingly facilitating con-
struction of more difficult items.
Discussion
The focus of the present study was twofold. We examined gifted and average-ability chil-
dren’s progression in analogy problem-solving after dynamic training or unguided practice. 
We also focused on whether a dynamic training would facilitate children’s performance and 
degree of transfer, and whether gifted and average-ability children show differences in their 
transfer accuracy and difficulty level.
We first looked into children’s potential for learning. The children who, in addition to 
unguided practice experiences, also received dynamic training showed steeper progression 
in accuracy than the children who were not trained, indicating that testing children’s ability 
dynamically shows a more complete picture of their cognitive potential than testing statically 
(e.g. Robinson-Zañartu & Carlson, 2013). We also focused on potential differences between 
gifted and average-ability children in relation to changes in analogy problem-solving per-
formance. Our findings suggest, as expected (e.g. Calero et al., 2011), that gifted children 
outperformed their average-ability peers in accuracy in analogy problem-solving. They did 
not, however, show differential progression in accuracy or reduction in completion time, 
which is in contrast to earlier findings (e.g. Kanevsky, 1990, 2000).
This finding could be explained, in part, by the fact that gifted children have been noted 
for their tendency towards perfectionism (Fletcher & Speirs Neumeister, 2012). Perhaps the 
gifted children in the current study took longer to solve the analogy items than was strictly 
necessary, due to perfectionistic tendencies, which could have been activated by working 
Table 5. Results of the regression analyses for transfer accuracy and difficulty level (correct × transfor-
mations).
*p < .05.; ***p < .001.; aordinal logistic regression.
b SE Exp (β) χ2
accurate analogiesa
 condition 2.16 1.59 8.64 1.83
 ability group .48 .71 1.61 .45
 condition × ability group −2.75* 1.33 .06* 4.29
Post-test accuracy score .22*** .06  1.25*** 11.82
 condition × Post-test accuracy score .09 .10 1.09 .73
transfer difficultya
 condition .14 1.07 1.15 .02
 ability group .30 .48 1.35 .39
 condition × ability group −.69 .70 .50 .98
Post-test accuracy score .16 .05  1.18*** 10.91
 condition × Post-test accuracy score −.01 .07 1.00 .01
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on a novel task. Whether this played a role in task solving could be further investigated, for 
instance by studying completion time patterns (Resing, Xenidou-Dervou, Steijn, & Elliott, 
2012).
In addition, children who were trained showed similar instead of differential levels of 
reduction in time needed to solve the analogies to their peers who did not receive training. 
In earlier research (Resing et al., 2015), it was posited that this might be due to children 
devoting more time to strategic considerations as a consequence of training. In the current 
study, however, children had to draw their own answers, which required substantial time 
and usage of motor skills. Completion time seemed to be dependent on other factors, such 
as children’s fine motor skills, as a result of which the reduction in completion time could, 
therefore, be ascribed to more familiarity with the task and an improvement in fine motor 
skills needed for the task.
Our second main aim was to explore potential differences in gifted and average-ability 
children’s transfer of practiced or learned skills. We utilised an analogy construction task 
(Bosma & Resing, 2006; Harpaz-Itay et al., 2006) in order to examine children’s transfer accu-
racy and difficulty level. First of all, we found that the majority of children could construct 
an accurate analogy, in contrast with earlier studies in which more children were found to 
have difficulty with this task (Resing et al., 2016; Stevenson et al., 2013). The children partic-
ipating in the current study were slightly older than in these previous studies, so we suggest 
that this is partly due to developments in their analogical reasoning (Leech et al., 2008). 
Training, however, could not predict transfer accuracy or transfer difficulty level.
Further, children were divided in groups on the basis of the degree to which they could 
transfer, looking more closely at the difficulty level of the constructed analogy items. We 
found that the group of children that had constructed analogy items with a high difficulty 
level contained significantly more children who were dynamically trained, while the group 
that had constructed low difficulty analogy items consisted of significantly fewer dynamically 
trained children than children who had received unguided practice opportunities. These 
findings suggest that, for at least some children, training was necessary in order to construct 
the more difficult analogy items. Other children, however, did not need training to construct 
difficult items, reflecting individual differences between children in relation to their analogy 
problem-solving and construction skills.
Contrary to our expectations, gifted children were not found to outperform their aver-
age-ability peers in transfer accuracy as well as difficulty level. It must be noted that in the 
current study, children had not been formally identified as gifted by means of full scale IQ 
testing, but were identified on the basis of their parents’ and teachers’ judgements as well 
as their scores on the Raven test. Although the Raven test is considered a reliable measure 
of general intelligence, perhaps utilising a stricter cut-off score than the 90th percentile used 
in the current study, or taking into account other factors rather than just cognitive factors 
(Kornilov, Tan, Elliott, Sternberg, & Grigorenko, 2012; Renzulli et al., 1997), would have led to 
more distinct differences in performance.
Moreover, it must be taken into consideration that the instructions of the transfer task 
did not specify that children had to construct complex analogies. Instead, they were kept 
to a minimum to elicit spontaneous problem-solving (Resing et al., 2016). Therefore, it cannot 
be disregarded that some of the gifted children were not motivated to construct difficult 
items. Clerc et al. (2014) provided a possible explanation for this finding. These authors stated 
that self-regulation is strongly associated with the ability to transfer, and that both children 
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with low self-regulation as well as those with high self-regulation, such as gifted children, 
as for example demonstrated by Calero et al. (2007), can experience difficulty with transfer. 
According to them, good metacognition might hinder some children’s transfer ability, as 
they do not want to use the strategy they have learned, before having fully mastered the 
cognitive processes necessary for utilising the strategy. A child’s metacognitive knowledge 
relating to the transferral of a strategy or skill might be ahead of the child’s actual ability to 
apply the strategy or skill. The fact that the gifted children who received unguided practice 
outperformed, in terms of transfer accuracy, their gifted peers who were trained lends some 
support to this explanation; perhaps training enhanced these children’s metacognitive 
knowledge, while their actual ability to apply what they had learned in training was not yet 
at the same level, making these children unwilling to apply the strategies they have learned 
to a difficult item.
Clerc et al.’s (2014) explanation might also, in part, account for the fact that training, 
contrary to our expectations, could not predict transfer accuracy or difficulty level. Other 
explanations could be that the tasks were too difficult for some of the children to achieve 
deep understanding in a short time-frame (e.g. Tzuriel & George, 2009), or that the training 
employed in the current study was too short. In future studies, it might be useful to make 
the training more intensive, for example by increasing the number of sessions, or the number 
of items per training session (Resing et al., 2016; Tzuriel & George, 2009). More research, 
however, is necessary to investigate exactly what type of training is beneficial.
Moreover, measuring transfer by means of an analogy construction task is a rather novel 
approach (Resing et al., 2016; Stevenson et al., 2013). Perhaps the shift from analogy prob-
lem-solving to analogy construction was too challenging for the children to unveil their true 
potential in analogy construction, as a result of which the effect of training did not transfer 
to analogy construction. Therefore, future studies could combine the analogy construction 
task with repeated practice opportunities, possibly in combination with a short training 
intervention. In previous research by Campione, Brown, Ferrara, Jones, and Steinberg (1985), 
for example, children were provided with training as part of a transfer task in analogical 
reasoning.
In addition to the limitations mentioned above, the current study had some other limi-
tations. The most important limitation concerns the relatively low number of participants 
in the subgroups. Due to the small sample sizes of our study, it is, of course, not possible to 
draw far-reaching conclusions. The effect sizes of the analyses, however, were found to range 
from large for main effects and interaction effects between session and condition, to small 
for interaction effects including ability group. Therefore, research replicating the current 
study employing larger sample sizes certainly is a necessity. Finally, it must be noted that 
the children in the dynamic testing condition had more exposure to analogy problem-solving 
than the children in the unguided practice condition. In future studies, therefore, it would 
be advisable to use an extra experimental condition, so that, during the training phase, one 
group of children receives training, one group receives additional practice, and one group 
receives an unrelated control task (as used, for example, by Stevenson et al., 2013).
Finally, the present study contributed to the existing research into transfer as we inves-
tigated both transfer accuracy, and complexity, and, thus, looked into both transfer perfor-
mance and the degree of transfer obtained by the children (Clerc et al., 2014). The findings 
from the present study support Siegler’s (2006), and Day and Goldstone’s (2012) suggestions 
that mastery of a skill is a requirement for transfer to occur, especially at the deep level, and 
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that transfer at the deep level is challenging for young children (Clerc et al., 2014; Resing et 
al., 2016). Only a small number of children could construct more difficult items, the majority 
of whom had received training in analogy-solving. Children showed considerable individual 
differences in their progression in accuracy, as well as their performance and effectiveness 
of transfer, findings that could only partially have been captured by traditional, static testing. 
In that sense, it seems plausible that dynamic testing might be a valuable instrument in 
capturing the underlying processes involved in progression in performance, as well as trans-
fer in relation to learned skills.
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